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In models with complete markets, targeting core inflation enables monetary policy to 
maximize welfare by replicating the flexible price equilibrium. In this paper, we develop a two-
sector two-good closed economy new Keynesian model to study the optimal choice of price 
index in markets with financial frictions. Financial frictions that limit credit-constrained 
consumers’ access to financial markets make demand insensitive to interest rate fluctuations. 
The demand of credit-constrained consumers is determined by their real wage, which 
depends on prices in the flexible price sector. Thus, prices in the flexible price sector 
influence aggregate demand and, for monetary policy to have its desired effect, the central 
bank has to stabilize price movements in the flexible price sector. Also, in the presence of 
financial frictions, stabilizing core inflation is no longer equivalent to stabilizing output 
fluctuations. Our analysis suggests that in the presence of financial frictions a welfare-
maximizing central bank should adopt flexible headline inflation targeting – a target based on 
headline rather than core inflation, and with some weight on the output gap. We discuss why 
these results are particularly relevant for emerging markets, where the share of food 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the appropriate objectives for 
monetary policy. For instance, it has been posited that a narrow version of inflation targeting 
(IT) could pose risks if it implies that potential asset bubbles are ignored by central banks. 
The emerging consensus appears to be that the IT framework has delivered price stability 
and should be retained but that central banks should use prudential regulation and other 
policy tools to counteract asset price bubbles. Whether or not IT is the chosen framework, 
central banks around the world view low and stable inflation as a primary, if not dominant, 
objective of monetary policy.  
 
What is the right price index that should be the focus of the inflation objective? This is a 
central operational issue in implementing not just IT but any version of monetary policy. 
Two key issues about the choice of price index are--determining the level of inflation that is 
consistent with the notion of price stability and determining the appropriate price index. In 
this paper, we focus on the task of analytically determining the appropriate price index for 
markets with financial frictions in general and emerging markets in particular.  
 
In the literature, the choice of price index has been guided by the idea that inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon. It has been suggested that core inflation (excluding food, energy 
and other volatile components from headline CPI) is the most appropriate measure of 
inflation (Wynne, 1999). The logic is that fluctuations in food and energy prices represent 
supply shocks and are non-monetary in nature.  Since these shocks are transitory and 
volatile and do not reflect changes in the underlying rate of inflation, they should not be a 
part of the inflation targeting price index (Mishkin, 2007, 2008).  
 
Previous authors have used models with price and/or wage stickiness to show that the 
choice of this price index is consistent with a welfare maximization objective. Existing 
models have looked at complete market settings where price stickiness is the only source of 
distortion (besides monopoly power). Infrequent price adjustments cause mark-ups to 
fluctuate and also distort relative prices. In order to restore the flexible price equilibrium, 
central banks should try to minimize these fluctuations by targeting sticky prices 
(Goodfriend and King, 1997, 2001). Using a variant of a New Keynesian model, Aoki 
(2001) has shown that under complete markets targeting inflation in the sticky price sector 
leads to welfare maximization and macroeconomic stability. Targeting core inflation is  
 
2 
equivalent to stabilizing the aggregate output gap as output and inflation move in the same 
direction under complete markets.  
 
Appropriateness of the core price index in these models relies heavily on the assumption 
that markets are complete (allowing households to fully insure against idiosyncratic risks) 
so that the central bank only needs to tackle the distortions created by price stickiness. 
However, there is compelling evidence that not all agents in the economy may be able to 
smooth their consumption (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989, 1990, 1991).
1 This observation is 
also consistent with the findings of a number of papers rejecting the permanent income 
hypothesis. It has been shown that, in the presence of credit-constrained consumers, 
policymakers’ welfare objectives are altered and the Taylor rule becomes too weak a 
criterion for stability (Amato and Laubach, 2003; and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2004)
 . 
 
Our main objective in this paper is to develop a model to study the welfare implications of 
targeting different price indices in an incomplete markets setting and to analytically 
determine the appropriate price index to target. A major contribution of this paper is to 
study the implication of financial frictions (modeled by the presence of credit constrained 
consumers) on the choice of the optimal price index.  
 
Financial frictions that result in credit-constrained consumers have not received much 
attention in models of inflation targeting. To examine the significance of financial frictions, 
we develop a model with heterogeneous agents, where a fraction of consumers cannot 
smooth their consumption—that is, they simply consume their current labor income.
2 When 
markets are not complete and agents differ in their ability to smooth consumption, their 
welfare depends on the nature of idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, this modeling choice also 
allows us to look at the welfare distribution under alternative choices of the price index.  
 
Under complete markets, the income distribution following a sector-specific shock does not 
matter for the choice of consumption and, hence, welfare. However, under incomplete 
markets, household income, which is influenced by the nature of shocks and the price 
                                                 
1 Campbell and Mankiw estimate that in the U.S. nearly 50 percent of income accrues to 
consumers who do not smooth their consumption. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2004) find 
that about 37 percent of consumers are rule-of-thumb consumers and they account for 59 percent 
of total employment. For further evidence on the proportion of credit-constrained consumers in 
the U.S., see Jappelli (1990), Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Fuhrer (2000), and 
Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004). 
2 We introduce this friction in a manner similar to that of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004).   
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elasticity of demand for goods, matters for the consumption choice.
3 Price elasticity of the 
demand for food, which has not attracted much attention in complete market settings, 
becomes important under incomplete markets. We show that, through its impact on a 
household’s income and expenditure, the low price elasticity of the demand for food is an 
important determinant of the optimal choice of price index under incomplete markets.
4 
 
We also incorporate other important features relevant to emerging markets into the model. 
The share of food in total household expenditures is much higher in emerging markets, 
constituting nearly 40-50 percent of household expenditures compared to 10-15 percent in 
advanced economies. Low price and income elasticities of food, and low income levels make 
the welfare of agents in emerging markets more sensitive to fluctuations in food prices. 
Since expenditure on food in total household expenditure is high and demand for food is 
relatively inelastic, agents may factor in food price inflation while bargaining over wages. 
Through this channel, food price inflation feeds into inflation expectations. Thus, in 
emerging markets even inflation expectation targeting central banks have to be concerned 
about food price inflation.
 5 
 
The key finding of the paper is that in the presence of financial frictions targeting core 
inflation (i.e., inflation in the sticky price sector) may not be optimal. Lack of access to 
financial markets makes the demand of credit-constrained consumers insensitive to 
fluctuations in interest rates. Since their demand depends only on real wages, a link is 
established between aggregate demand and real wages. Thus, in the presence of financial 
frictions, the relative price of the good produced in the flexible price sector not only affects 
aggregate supply but, through its effects on real wages, also influences aggregate demand.  
 
This result is at variance with the prior literature based on complete markets settings. For 
instance, in Aoki’s (2001) model, relative prices of the flexible price sector only appear as a 
shift parameter of inflation in the sticky price sector. Under incomplete markets, by contrast, 
the central bank cannot ignore fluctuations in the price of the good produced in the flexible 
                                                 
3 A negative productivity shock related to a good with a low price elasticity of demand could 
increase the income of net sellers of that good and raise the expenditure of net buyers on that 
good. 
4 A survey by the U.S. Department of Agriculture suggests that the average price elasticity of 
food is -0.34 in a sample of 114 countries; this estimate is smaller in absolute terms than the 
elasticity normally used in other models, most of which assume a unitary price elasticity. 
5 Walsh (2010) documents the high pass-through from food price inflation to non-food inflation in 
middle- and low-income countries.    
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price sector if it wants to affect aggregate demand. Financial frictions break the comovement 
of inflation and output (as inflation and output may now move in opposite directions). 
Stabilizing core inflation is no longer sufficient to stabilize output. Thus, in the presence of 
financial frictions targeting flexible headline inflation is a better policy choice.  
 
Since our model exhibits monetary super-neutrality, we limit our analysis to non-
inflationary steady states (long-run price stability) and do not have anything to say about the 
optimal level of inflation. We also do not attempt to define optimal policy rules but focus on 
evaluating welfare outcomes of different policy rules using alternative measures of inflation.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some empirical facts to 
further motivate the analysis. In Section 3, we develop a two-sector, two-good model with 
heterogeneous agents that encapsulates the features discussed above. In Section 4 we 
discuss the main results and in Section 5 we conduct various sensitivity experiments to 
check the robustness of our baseline results and also present some extensions of the basic 
model. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2.  Basic Stylized Facts 
We begin by presenting some stylized facts about the share of household consumption 
expenditures on food and also various measures of the elasticity of food expenditures. In a 
cross-country comparison, emerging markets and advanced countries differ markedly on 
these measures. Next, we present data on credit constraints in emerging markets. We also 
look at the features of core and headline CPI inflation measures in some emerging and 
advanced economies. 
 
Engel’s law states that as average household income increases the average share of food 
expenditure in total household expenditure declines. When this idea is extended to 
countries, we expect poor countries to have a high average share of food expenditure in 
total household expenditure. Figure 1 plots the expenditure on food (as a percentage of 
total expenditure) against log real per capital income for the year 1996.
6 It shows that 
countries with lower per capita income levels have a higher share of expenditure on food 
in total household expenditure. In order to examine how emerging markets differ from 
                                                 
6 We use data for 1996 for illustrative purposes since data for a large number of countries were 
available for that year.   
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advanced countries, in Table 1 we present recent data on shares of food expenditure in 
total expenditure for selected emerging and advanced economies.
7 As expected, 
expenditure on food constitutes a much larger share of total household expenditure in 
emerging markets relative to advanced economies. 
 
Income and price elasticities of the demand for food are important for our analysis. 
Figure 2 plots the income elasticity of food against real per capita GDP for the year 1996. 
The income elasticity of food is low, suggesting that food is a necessary good. Since 
expenditure on food is not a major share of household expenditure in rich countries, the 
income elasticity of food is much lower.
8 We present the income elasticity of food for 
selected emerging market and advanced economies in Table 2.  The income elasticity of 
food in emerging markets is on average twice as large as that in advanced economies. 
Figure 3 plots, for a large sample of countries, the Slutsky own price elasticity of food 
against the log real per capita GDP for the year 1996.
9 The price elasticity of food 
demand is nonlinear, decreasing at low income levels, and then increasing, with a range 
from -0.4 to -0.1. We also present data on the Slutsky own-price elasticity of food for 
selected countries in Table 2.
10 The price elasticity of food is very low (suggesting that 
the demand for food is inelastic). As the share of expenditure on food is high in emerging 
markets, the price elasticity of food is higher in these economies. However, the overall 
value of the price elasticity of food is much lower than what is used in the literature on 
inflation targeting. Low price and income elasticities of the demand for food have 
considerable significance for the choice of price index.  
 
In order to examine the extent of credit constraints in emerging markets, in Table 3 we 
present data on the percentage of the adult population with access to formal finance 
                                                 
7 We looked at household surveys for each country in this table rather than the weight of food in 
each country’s CPI index since those weights are changed only occasionally. However, data from 
household surveys are available for only a few emerging markets. These data typically cover 
expenditure on food consumed at home and don’t include expenditures on beverages and tobacco.  
8 A low income elasticity of demand also means that, as family income increases, consumption of 
the commodity will not increase by much.  
9 The Slutsky own price elasticity is estimated by keeping real income constant.  
10 Frisch elasticity values lie between Slutsky and Cournot values and can be considered as an 
average own price elasticity.  
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(measured by the share of the population using financial services) in emerging markets. 
On average, more than half of the population in emerging markets does not have access 
to the formal financial system.  
 
Next, we examine the characteristics of core and headline inflation. We plot the levels 
and volatility of inflation for selected advanced and emerging market economies (Figure 
4-5). Values of average inflation, average volatility and the persistence of inflation (for 
the period March 1991 – September 2009) are reported in Table 4. The two measures of 
inflation have very different characteristics in advanced and emerging market economies. 
Average inflation (both headline and core) has been higher in emerging market 
economies during the period reported. Headline inflation is more volatile than core 
inflation in both advanced and emerging market economies. However, the volatility of 
both inflation measures is much higher in emerging markets. Core inflation has on 
average been more than twice as volatile in emerging market economies compared to 
advanced countries. The two measures of inflation exhibit a high degree of persistence in 
both sets of economies.
11 
 
We also look at the evolution of two price indices over time. It is expected that they 
would deviate from each other in the short run (as the core measure is constructed to 
eliminate the fluctuations which do not reflect the underlying inflation developments). 
However, since transitory shocks (shocks to food and energy) do not change the 
underlying trend, headline inflation should return to its original level in a short period 
(Mishkin, 2007). In other words, the headline inflation measure should not remain above 
the core inflation measure for an extended period. 
 
                                                 
11 In a cross-country study, Walsh (2010) finds that food price inflation is in fact more persistent 
than non-food price inflation. This holds for both advanced and emerging market economies, 
although he finds that food price inflation is more persistent in emerging markets.  
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To verify this, we examine the two measures of inflation for two representative core 
inflation targeting countries – Canada and Thailand.
12 In Canada, in the period from the 
spring of 1999 to the fall of 2001, headline inflation remained above core inflation for 30 
months in succession (Figure 4a). In Thailand, headline inflation has remained above 
core inflation for more than 5 consecutive years (Figure 5a). The core inflation measure 
excludes a number of expenditure items and is less representative of the cost of living. 
Thus, differences in the behavior of headline inflation (ostensibly a more accurate 
measure of the cost of living) and core inflation over an extended period may have 
important welfare implications. 
3.  The Model 
Our model builds upon a large literature that has developed and analyzed dynamic sticky 
price models (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 1996; Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1997, 1999; Aoki, 2001). The model is rendered more realistic by 
incorporating two features that are relevant to all economies but are particularly 
important for emerging markets--a fraction of consumers who are credit constrained and 
a subsistence level of food consumption. The model has two sectors and two goods—one 
type of flexible price good, food ( F C ), whose prices adjust instantaneously, and a 
continuum of monopolistically produced sticky price goods, 
) 1 , 0 ( in    indexed   ) ( ! z z c which we call non-food and whose prices adjust sluggishly.
13 In 
the subsequent discussion, we interchangeably use the term food sector for the flexible 
price sector and the term non-food sector for the sticky price sector. 
3.1  Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of 1 + λ infinitely lived households, 
where 0 > ! , is the continuum of households in the flexible price sector (food sector). 
Each household owns a firm and produces one good. They provide labor to the firms in 
their respective sector (we assume that labor is immobile across sectors) and consume 
                                                 
12 Canada is an advanced economy that adopted IT in 1991 while Thailand, an emerging market 
economy, adopted IT in 2000. Canada targets core inflation excluding food, energy and indirect 
taxes. Thailand targets core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices.  
13 We model the sticky price sector by a continuum of monopolistic firms so that these firms have 
market power and they can set prices. This is done to introduce price stickiness in this sector.  
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both the flexible price good (food) and all of the differentiated sticky price goods (non 
food).
14 The representative consumer, i, is indexed by f (flexible price sector) and s 
(sticky price sector). Household i maximizes the discounted stream of utility  
 








t N C u E !
"
=
#                  (1)               
 

























N C u              (2) 
 
where the argument 
i
t C  is the composite consumption index of household i in period t. 
i
t C includes the flexible price good and the entire continuum of the differentiated goods. 
It is defined as 
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The elasticity of substitution between the flexible price and sticky price goods is given 
by ] , 0 [ ! " #  and  ] 1 , 0 [ ! "  is the weight on food in the consumption index. The parameter 
                                                 
14 We have assumed the immobility of labor for simplicity and to capture the large inter-sectoral 
wage differential in emerging markets. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) have demonstrated 
in their model that, even with free labor mobility, financial frictions lead to similar results as ours 
(aggregate demand going up even when the central bank raises the policy interest rate).  
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θ >1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two differentiated goods, 
i
t N  is the 
aggregate labor supplied by household i in period t and !  is the risk aversion factor 
(inverse of elasticity of inter temporal substitution). The parameter !  is the inverse of 
Frisch elasticity and  n !   is a scaling factor. 
 
The utility function used here is of a generalized Klein-Rubin form.
15 This form is 
selected to model the role of food in the economy. Since food is a necessity, households 
must consume a minimum amount C
* of food for survival.
16 We assume that all 
households always have enough income to buy the subsistence level of food. Even 
though the subsistence level food consumption does not bind, it plays a vital role by 
altering the elasticity of substitution between food and non-food and the marginal utility 
of food and non-food consumption. 
3.1.1  Flexible Price Sector (Food Sector) Households 
Households in the flexible price sector (food sector) do not have access to financial 
markets and they consume their wage income in each period.
17 So these households are 
akin to the “rule of thumb” consumers. Each household in the sector owns one firm and 
produces food by linear technology in labor, given by 
 
f
t t f t f N A y , , =                   (5) 
 
Af,t is a random productivity shock. Since we are interested in analyzing the effects of 
sector-specific shocks rather than household-level idiosyncratic shocks, we assume that 
all the households in the food sector face the same shock. 
                                                 
15 Expenditure system corresponding to Klein-Rubin utility function is referred to as the Stone-
Geary linear expenditure system; Stone (1954) and Geary (1949). 
16 This is also similar to habit persistence with C
* being independent of time. 
17 There is no storage technology in the model. So consumers in the flexible price sector cannot 
smooth their consumption by saving their output. We have made this restrictive assumption to 
keep the model tractable. Moreover, Table 3 shows that more than 50 percent of individuals in 
emerging markets lack access to formal finance. Basu et al. (2005) have documented that 80 




3.1.2  Sticky Price Sector (Non Food Sector) Households 
Households in this sector can buy one period nominal bonds and smooth their 
consumption. Each household owns a firm and provides labor to each firm in the sector. 
They hold one share in each firm of the sector. Each firm uses a linear technology in 
labor given by 
 
) ( ) ( , z N A z y
s
t t s t =                 (6) 
 
where   ) (z yt  is a  sticky price good and  ) (z N
s
t is the labor used in the firm producing 
good indexed by z ( where ] 1 , 0 [   ! z ). As,t is a random productivity shock. We assume that 
the shock is identical for all households in the non-food sector. 
3.2  Consumption Decision 
3.2.1  Food Sector Households (Credit Constrained Consumers) 
All households in this sector face an identical budget constraint every period (as their 
wage income is the same in every period). A representative household maximizes its 
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where f,t P  is the market price of food,  t s P , is the price index of non-food (defined below) 
and 
f Wt  is the nominal wage in the food sector. The optimal allocation for a given level 
of spending between food and all the differentiated non-food goods leads to a Dixit-
Stiglitz demand relation. The total expenditure to attain a consumption index 
f
t C  is given 
by 
f
t tC P  where  t P  is defined as 
 









The budget constraint can be written as: 
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) (z X t is the price of differentiated good indexed on z at time t. Demand for each 
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The labor supply decision is given by the usual first order condition with respect to 
f
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3.2.2  Non Food Sector households (Unconstrained Consumers) 
Each household in this sector provides labor to each one of the firms in the sector and 
also holds one share in each firm. This setting is the one followed by Woodford (2003).
18 
In this setup, each household faces the same budget constraint each period and hence 
chooses the same consumption stream. A representative household maximizes the 
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where  t B represents the quantity of one-period nominal riskfree discount bonds bought in 
period t  and maturing in period t+1 and t R  is the gross nominal interest rate between 
period t and t+1.  ) (z W
s
t  and  ) (z N
s
t  represent the nominal wage prevalent in firm z and 
the amount of labor supplied to firm z by the household, respectively.  ) (z
s
t !  is the profit 
of firm z. Maximization with respect to 
s
































 is gross headline inflation. The labor supply decision of the household 
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18 Alternatively, we could use the other set up specified in Woodford (2003) in which each 
household produces one of the differentiated products and there exist a complete range of 
securities through which they can insure fully against idiosyncratic risks. In that formulation also, 
each household will choose the same consumption stream and therefore the analysis will be the 
same as in the present setting.  
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3.3  Firms 
3.3.1  Firms in the Flexible Price Sector (Food Sector) 
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The supply function for the flexible price firm is obtained by combining equations (5), 
































The market-clearing condition for food implies 
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It can be considered as the total composite demand and hence equal to supply in 
equilibrium. 
3.3.2  Firms in the Sticky Price Sector 
We follow Calvo (1983) and Woodford (1996) in modeling price stickiness. A fraction 
) 1 , 0 ( ! "  of firms cannot change their price in each period. Firms are free to change the 
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The sticky sector price index is expressed by 
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 is the constant markup over the marginal cost.
19 
 
Equations (8), (9), (16), (22), (23), (28), (30), (31) and (32), coupled with a monetary 
policy rule to choose the nominal interest rate, jointly determine the equilibrium path of 
consumption, output and price index in both the sectors. 
                                                 
19 Since the technology is linear, MCt,t+j = MCt+j That is, marginal cost is independent of the level 
of production.  
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3.4  Inflation and Relative Prices 





















relative price charged by firms which are free to choose the price in time t. We define the 

















 . The relationship between headline and core inflation (inflation in the sticky 
price sector) is given by: 
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The system of equations in terms of stationary variables is presented in Appendix I.  
3.5  Steady State 
We characterize the steady state with constant prices (zero inflation) and no price 
stickiness in the economy.
20 This implies that  1   and   1 , = ! = ! t s t  for all t. Under 
symmetric equilibrium, each firm faces the same demand and sets the same price. Thus, 
1    and   , = = t t s t x P X .  Therefore, 
r






 . In the steady state, all firms set a price 
which is a constant markup over the real marginal cost.
21 We assume that productivity is 
the same in both the sectors and normalize it to one. 
                                                 
20 Our model exhibits monetary super-neutrality. Therefore, the level of steady state inflation does 
not affect steady state values of real variables.  
21 We also compute the welfare gains when the steady state involves a tax rate which is set such 
that the steady state level of output in the sticky price sector is efficient. All our results go 
through under this alternative characterization of steady state.  
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3.6  Monetary Policy Rule 
We assume that the monetary authority sets the short term nominal interest ( t R ) 
according to a simple Taylor (1993) type rule of the following form 
 




Y Y R R R R t y t t i t ! ! ! " + # # + = $      (34) 
where 
_ _ _
  and   , R Y !  are the steady state values of output, inflation and the nominal interest 
rate, respectively. The term i !  represents the Central Banker’s preference for interest rate 
smoothing.  ! "  and  y !  are the weights on inflation and output gap assigned by the policy 
makers.
22 We characterize core inflation as the inflation in the sticky price sector, t s, ! , 
and headline inflation as the over all inflation,  t ! , for our policy experiments. 
 
We evaluate our model under the following monetary policy regimes: 
 
Strict Core Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares only about interest rate smoothing 
and stabilizing inflation in the sticky price sector. 






s t s t i t R R R R ! ! + = " # $ $         (35) 
 
Strict Headline Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares only about interest rate 
smoothing and stabilizing headline inflation. 




! ! + = " t t i t R R R R # $ $         (36) 
 
                                                 
22 We include an interest rate smoothing parameter in our monetary policy rule as the benefits of 
such smoothing are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Lowe and Ellis, 1997; Sack and 
Wieland, 1999). Various authors have argued that moving interest rates in small steps increases 
its impact on the long-term interest rate; it also reduces the risks of policy mistakes and prevents 
large capital losses and systemic financial risks. Mohanty and Klau (2004) find that all emerging 
market central banks put substantial weight on interest rate smoothing. Clarida et al.(1998) find 
that central banks of advanced economies also put a large weight on interest rate smoothing.  
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Flexible Core Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares about interest rate smoothing 
and in addition to stabilizing sticky price inflation also tries to stabilize output by 
assigning a weight to the output gap (deviation of output from trend). 






Y Y R R R R t y s t s t i t ! ! ! " + # # + = $      (37) 
 
Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares about interest rate 
smoothing and in addition to stabilizing headline inflation also tries to stabilize output. 




Y Y R R R R t y t t i t ! ! ! " + # # + = $      (38) 
3.7  Exogenous Shock Process 
We assume that the productivity in the flexible price sector and sticky price sector follow 
AR(1) processes 
 
t t f af t f A A ! " + = + , 1 ,   ,  t ! ~ i.i.d. (0,  af ! )          (39) 
t t s as t s A A ! " + = + , 1 ,   ,  t ! ~ i.i.d. (0,  as ! )          (40) 
 
In the literature, exclusion of food prices from the price index has been justified on the 
ground that shocks to food (and energy) prices represent supply shocks. In order to 
compare our model with those in the prior literature and also to highlight the role of 
adverse supply shocks on the choice of price index, we focus on productivity shocks. 
3.8  Competitive Equilibrium 
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of processes 
t t t t t s t f,t t s t f
s
t
f mc x R y y y x x C C
t   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   , , t s, , , ! !  for t = 0,1,… that remain bounded in 
some neighborhood around the deterministic steady state and satisfy equations (52) – (62) 
of Appendix I, given the exogenous stochastic processes  t f A ,  ,  t s A ,  and the monetary 
policy rule given by equation (34).  
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3.9  Complete Markets Specification 
We follow the setting of Aoki (2001) to study the choice of price index under complete 
markets. In this setting all households can insure one another against idiosyncratic 
income risks completely. It implies that given same initial wealth each household will 
choose an identical consumption sequence.
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Equations (53), (55)-(61) of Appendix I and (41)-(42) define the system of equations that 
combined with the monetary policy rule and exogenous stochastic processes  t f A ,  and t s A ,  
determine the equilibrium path of the economy in the complete markets setting. 
3.10  Welfare Evaluations 
We are interested in the choice of policy rule that yields the highest level of lifetime utility 
within the class of policy rules considered.
24 In particular, we evaluate policy rules 












t N C U E V + +
!
= " # $  for i = f,s           (43) 
 
We compute the total welfare of the economy as a weighted sum of households’ welfare 
                                                 
23 Insurance contracts are assumed to be written before households know which sector they are 
assigned to. The insurance contracts make the marginal utility of nominal income identical across 
the households at any time t. 
24 We study the policy rule which is implementable and optimal as defined by Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2007). Implementability refers to the local uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium 
while optimality means that it yields the highest lifetime utility within the class of policy rules 






t total V V V + = * ! . Formally, we compute  total V  associated with each policy rule and look 
for a policy rule that yields the highest value of total V . 
3.11  Solution Method  
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), it has 
become commonplace to characterize the solution of nonlinear models using 
approximation methods, with first-order approximation techniques being the norm. 
However, it is now widely accepted that first-order approximation techniques are ill-
suited for the comparison of different policy environments using aggregate utility as a 
welfare criterion.
25 To enable accurate welfare comparisons across alternative policy 
environments, we need at least a second-order approximation of the equilibrium welfare 
function (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004; Woodford, 2003).
26  
 
In recent years, scholars have come up with various methods to produce second-order 
accurate approximation to the solutions of DSGE models. Jin and Judd (2002), Collard 
and Juillard (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) have used the perturbation 
method for second-order and higher-order approximations. Kim and Kim (2003) and 
Sutherland (2002) have developed the bias correction method that produces similar 
results as the second order perturbation method. 
 
We compute the second-order accurate consumer welfare measure with different 
monetary policy regimes as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). To produce an accurate 
second-order approximation of the welfare function, we use a second-order 
approximation to the policy function. The policy function is approximated using the 
perturbation method by employing a scale parameter for the standard deviations of the 
exogenous shocks as an argument of the policy function and taking a second-order Taylor 
expansion with respect to the state variables as well as the scale parameter. We use an 
                                                 
25 Up to a first-order approximation, lifetime utility, Vt, is equal to its non-stochastic steady state 
value. Hence, given the same non-stochastic steady state, all policy rules yield the same amount 
of welfare up to a first-order approximation (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007).  
26See Kim and Kim (2003). However, if one is sure that nonlinearity is small in certain 
dimensions one can justify using a first-order approximation by making specific assumptions, 
Woodford (2003).  
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approximation algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) with suitable 
modifications. 
3.12  Measuring Welfare Gains 
Strict core inflation targeting is regarded as the welfare maximizing policy rule in the 
literature. Therefore, we evaluate the welfare gains associated with a particular policy 
regime by comparing it to the strict core inflation targeting rule allocation. Let the strict 
core inflation targeting rule allocation be denoted by r, and an alternative policy regime 
be denoted by a.  We define the welfare associated with the core allocation conditional on 










t r N C U E V !
"
=




t C  and 
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t N  are the consumption and hours of work under the strict core inflation 
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The use of the conditional rather than unconditional expectation is consistent with the 
approach followed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Kollman (2004). The use of 
the conditional expectation is preferable in our framework given that different policy 
regimes will typically have different stochastic steady states even though their non-
stochastic states are identical. Hence, as pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), 
the unconditional expectation of utility ignores the transitional dynamics leading to the 
stochastic steady state. As a result, we follow the procedure of conditioning our 





In order to evaluate the welfare implications of a particular policy regime, we calculate 
the fraction of a consumer’s consumption that would make them indifferent between 
regimes. Let ! be the welfare gain of adopting an alternative policy rule other than strict 
core inflation targeting. We define !  as a fraction of additional strict core inflation 
targeting regime’s consumption process that would make a household as well off under 
regime a as under strict core inflation targeting regime. Then 
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Under this specification, a positive value of !  means that welfare is higher under the 
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A value of ! *100 = 1, represents a one percentage point of permanent consumption gain 
under the alternative policy regime.  
 
We study the choice of the optimal price index under two market settings–(i) complete 
markets (similar to Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Aoki, 2001) and (ii) an incomplete 
market structure characterized by the presence of ‘rule of thumb’ consumers (similar to 
Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2004).  We compute the welfare gains associated with the 
four monetary policy regimes defined by equations (35)-(38).  
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3.13  Parameter Selection 
Parameter selection for the model is a challenging task. There is no consensus on the 
values of some parameters. Moreover, most of the parameters used in the literature are 
based on micro data from advanced countries. Hence, our approach will be to pick 
baseline parameters from the existing literature and to then do extensive sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the choice of key parameters.  
 
We choose ! =0.9902, which amounts to an annual real interest rate of 4 percent 
(Prescott, 1986). We assume that ! =1 (that is, we have one representative consumer in 
each sector, similar to Aoki, 2001). We use ! =2 as the baseline value of the risk 
aversion parameter, (i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5). This is in the 
range of values usually assumed in DSGE models and is also the most common value 
used in the literature on emerging markets (Aguair and Gopinath, 2005; Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe, 2007; Devereux, Lane and Xu, 2004).
27 
 
Following Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan (1999), Basu and Fernald (1994, 1995), Basu 
and Kimball (1997) and Basu (1996), we choose ! =10 (elasticity of substitution between 
different differentiated goods), which implies a markup of 11 percent. Next, we set the 
probability that a price does not adjust in a given period (! ) at 0.66 (Ferrero, Gertler, 
Svensson, 2008; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). This implies that prices remain fixed 
for a mean duration of 3 quarters, which is consistent with the micro evidence. 
 
The appropriate value of the Frisch elasticity (
!
1
) is both important and controversial. 
The range of values used in the literature goes from 0.25 to 1.
28 For our benchmark case 
we assume it to be 0.33 (! =3). We choose the scaling parameter n !  such that the average 
                                                 
27 Friend and Blume (1975) present empirical evidence suggesting that its value is around 2 for 
industrial countries. Other estimates for these countries suggests that it lies between 0 and 5 (e.g., 
Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Dunn and Singleton, 1986).  
28 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) estimate it to be 0.25 while Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1997) estimate it to be 0.40. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) estimate the intertemporal 
elasticity of labor supply to be in the range of [0.5, 1].  
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hours worked in the steady state is 0.38. The elasticity of substitution between food and 
non-food goods, ! , is another parameter for which we don’t have a good approximation. 
As the demand for food is inelastic, we set ! = 0.6 for the baseline case.
29 
 
One important feature of emerging markets is the high share of expenditure on food in 
total household expenditure.  Based on the household surveys from emerging markets, 
the average expenditure on food is around 42 percent (see Table 1). In addition, we 
assume that on average half of the households’ steady state food consumption is required 
for subsistence.
30 To match these values in the baseline model we choose subsistence 
level food consumption parameter, 
* C =0.1013 and the weight on food in the 
consumption index,!  equal to 0.3050 so that the steady state average household 
expenditure on food is 42%. For the monetary policy parameters, we follow Woodford 
(2003), Gali et al. (2004) and Mohanty and Klau (2004) and choose  i ! = 0.7,  ! " = 2 and 
Y ! = 0.5.  
The major argument in favor of excluding food from the core price index is that the 
shocks in that sector are seasonal and transient. We choose the value of AR(1) coefficient 
of the food sector shock at 0.25 (implying that the shock lasts for four quarters, which 
seems reasonable given the heavy dependence of agriculture on weather conditions in 
emerging markets). Following the literature, we set the value of the AR(1) coefficient of 
the non-food sector shock at 0.95 (Aguair and Gopinath, 2007; Schmitt-Grohe  and 
Uribe, 2007). Volatility of productivity shocks in emerging markets is higher than in 
advanced countries (Pallage and Robe, 2003; Aguair and Gopinath, 2007). We choose the 
standard deviation of food productivity shock, af ! =0.03 and the standard deviation of 
non-food productivity shock,  as ! =0.02.
31 Table 5 shows a full set of baseline parameter 
values for the calibrations. 
                                                 
29 With the subsistence level of food consumption, this parameter choice implies a price elasticity 
of demand for food of about -0.3 in the steady state, which is close to the USDA estimate.  
30 Naik and Moore (1996) find that about 50 percent of current consumption is due to habit 
formation in food consumption.  
31 For advanced countries like the U.S., the values typically used in the literature are in the range 
of 0.005 to 0.009.   
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4.  Baseline Results 
We present the results in terms of the conditional welfare gains associated with each 
policy choice. Welfare gains are defined as additional lifetime consumption needed to 
make the level of welfare under strict core inflation targeting identical to that under the 
evaluated policy. Thus, a positive number indicates that welfare is higher under the 
alternative policy than under strict core inflation targeting policy. The choice of strict 
core inflation targeting as a benchmark for comparison is motivated by the fact that in the 
literature it is considered the optimal policy choice for maximizing welfare. We present 
the results for three alternative policy regimes – strict headline inflation targeting, 
flexible headline inflation targeting and flexible core inflation targeting as defined by 
equations (35)-(38). 
 
Table 6 shows the welfare gains from targeting different price indices under complete 
and incomplete market settings. Under complete markets, the choice of targeting strict 
core inflation is the best policy. Figure 6 plots the impulse responses of various 
macroeconomic variables to a one percent negative food productivity shock under 
complete markets. Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from 
its steady state level. Impulse responses under strict core inflation targeting rule are 
shown in red. The dashed lines (in blue) are impulse responses under the strict headline 
inflation targeting rule.
32 As evident, strict headline inflation targeting regime results in a 
higher volatility of consumption and output. Also, the policy response is more aggressive 
under strict headline inflation targeting which leads to a further decline in output. These 
results are similar to the ones documented in the existing literature on inflation targeting.  
 
Following an increase in inflation, the central bank raises interest rates, reducing 
aggregate demand (as consumers postpone their consumption following an increase in 
interest rates) and, thus, inflation. So, under complete markets, inflation and output move 
in the same direction and therefore stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing output 
                                                 
32 We only plot the impulse responses under strict core inflation targeting and strict headline 
inflation targeting rules as the welfare losses are much higher under other two policy regimes 
(Table 6).  
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(Aoki, 2001). It also implies that there are no additional welfare gains by adopting 
flexible inflation targeting. Thus, under complete markets, strict core inflation targeting is 
the welfare maximizing policy choice for the central bank.  
 
However, in the presence of credit constrained consumers, flexible headline inflation 
targeting appears to be a better policy choice. Figure 7 plots the impulse responses of 
various macroeconomic variables to a one percent negative food productivity shock.
33 
Aggregate demand responds differently to monetary tightening under the two policy 
regimes. The central bank is able to reduce aggregate demand by increasing interest rates 
only when it targets headline inflation. Aggregate demand, instead of going down, goes 
up if central bank follows strict core inflation targeting. Thus, headline inflation targeting 
(both strict and flexible) outperforms strict core inflation targeting. Since in the presence 
of financial frictions inflation and output may move in opposite directions in response to 
interest rate changes, stabilizing output results in welfare gains. Thus, flexible headline 
inflation targeting is the optimal policy choice when markets are not complete. 
 
In order to examine the mechanics behind this result, we look at the properties of 
aggregate demand under incomplete markets. In the presence of financial frictions, the 
consumption choices of different households vary (as opposed to complete markets, 
where the consumption choice of each household is identical). While consumption 
demand of unconstrained households is responsive to interest rates (as they optimize 
inter-temporally), consumption demand of credit-constrained households is independent 
of interest rate changes (their horizon is static and they consume their entire income each 
period) and depends only on their current period wage income. Since only a fraction of 
aggregate demand is influenced by interest rate changes, a monetary tightening does not 
automatically result in the decline of aggregate demand. The response of aggregate 
demand crucially depends on the behavior of credit-constrained households. 
 
                                                 
33 We only plot the impulse responses under strict core inflation targeting and flexible headline 
inflation targeting rules. The welfare gains relative to core inflation targeting are also positive but 
lower under the other two policy rules (Table 6).  
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Figure 7 shows that, following a negative shock to food productivity, the central bank 
raises the interest rate which lowers the demand of unconstrained households (as it is 
optimal for them to postpone consumption). However, it has no bearing on the demand of 
credit-constrained consumers. An increase in the relative price of food following a 
negative food productivity shock increases the wage income and, therefore, consumption 
demand of credit-constrained households. Thus, the demand of the two types of 
households moves in opposite directions following a negative shock to food productivity.  
 
Which of the two demands dominates is determined by the policy regime. Since core 
inflation targeting ignores food price inflation, the increase in food prices (and, therefore, 
the wage income of the food sector households) is higher than the increase under headline 
inflation targeting. This higher wage income translates into higher consumption demand 
by credit-constrained consumers (as they consume all of their current wage income), 
which more than compensates for the lower consumption demand of unconstrained 
consumers. Consequently, aggregate demand rises. By contrast, when the central bank 
targets headline inflation, price increases in the food sector are much lower and the rise in 
income and, therefore, the increase in consumption demand in that sector is not enough to 
compensate for the decline in the demand of unconstrained consumers. Thus, monetary 
intervention is effective in achieving its objective of reducing aggregate demand only 
when the central bank targets flexible headline inflation.   
 
To formalize the above arguments, we examine the log-linearized aggregate demand 
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s "  is the steady state share of the sticky price households’ consumption, 
                                                 
34 Aggregate demand is the sum of the log-linearized consumption demand of food and non-food 
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Equations (50) and (51) suggest that, in the presence of credit-constrained consumers, a 
link is established between aggregate demand and the relative price of food. This is 
because, in the presence of financial frictions, relative prices affect aggregate demand in 
addition to aggregate supply.
35 Thus, the presence of financial frictions implies that 
managing aggregate demand requires the central bank to choose a policy regime that 
would limit the rise in wages of credit-constrained consumers (and, therefore, the 
increase in their demand).  
4.1  Welfare Distribution 
The focus of our paper is on average welfare but the incomplete markets setting allows us 
to look at the welfare distribution in the economy. We do not report those results in detail 
here but note that in our model flexible headline inflation targeting is better for both the 
credit-constrained households and unconstrained households. Since there is no tradeoff 
involved in terms of welfare of the two groups, the central bank is not likely to face any 
political pressures in implementing this policy. 
5.  Sensitivity Analysis 
Our main result is that in the presence of financial frictions flexible headline inflation 
targeting is the welfare-maximizing policy choice. In this section, we evaluate the 
                                                 
35 Under complete markets, relative prices only affect aggregate supply (Aoki, 2001).  
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robustness of this result to changes in some of the key parameters – the elasticity of 
substitution between food and non-food goods (! ), inverse of Frisch elasticity (! ), the 
degree of price stickiness (! ), the elasticity of substitution between different non-food 
goods which determines the mark-up in the sticky price sector (! ), and the proportion of 
credit-constrained households in the economy (! ). We conduct additional sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the persistence and volatility of the food productivity shock and 
Taylor rule coefficients. When interpreting the results it should be noted that, since the 
steady state values of the models differ, it is only possible to make a comparison across 
regimes and not across different models.  
 
Our key results are driven by the behavior of credit-constrained consumers. Since the 
wage income of constrained consumers depends crucially on the price elasticity of the 
demand for food, we first conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to parameters 
influencing the price elasticity of demand. The presence of a subsistence level for food 
expenditures affects the marginal utility of food and non-food consumption. It also 
lowers the elasticity of substitution between food and non-food. The demand for food is 
given by equation (23), which is the sum of an iso-elastic term  t t f C x
! "
# ) ( ,  and a price 
inelastic term
* ) 1 ( C ! + . The price elasticity of demand is a weighted sum of these two 
terms (the weights are !  and zero, respectively). Thus, the presence of subsistence food 
consumption lowers the price elasticity of the demand for food. Table 7 shows welfare 
gains from different policy rules in the absence of a subsistence level of food 
consumption. Clearly, our main result does not depend on the presence of subsistence 
level of food consumption.  
 
Next, we examine the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of substitution between 
food and non-food goods, denoted by !  (Table 8). Under complete markets, core 
inflation targeting is the most appropriate policy choice for any value of the elasticity of 
substitution. However, under incomplete markets, flexible headline inflation targeting 
continues to dominate other policies for values of the elasticity as high as !  = 0.8. For 
higher values of this elasticity, strict core inflation targeting seems to do marginally better  
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than strict headline inflation targeting. The difference between strict core inflation 
targeting and strict headline inflation targeting is almost negligible for higher values of 
this elasticity.  
 
The elasticity of substitution is an important parameter determining the income of credit-
constrained households. For low values of the elasticity of substitution, following a 
negative shock to productivity of food the demand for food does not go down 
substantially and leads to a large increase in the wage income of food-producing (credit-
constrained) households. Increased demand of credit-constrained consumers is enough to 
counteract the decline in the demand of unconstrained households. However, when the 
elasticity of substitution is high, demand for food goes down substantially and the 
increase in the income and demand of credit-constrained households is no longer 
sufficient to compensate for the decline in the demand of unconstrained households. In 
fact, for sufficiently high values of the elasticity of substitution, the wage income of 
credit-constrained households may even go down.  
 
Again, even though we cannot strictly compare the impulse responses, it is instructive to 
plot them for different values of the elasticity of substitution to understand how varying 
the elasticity of substitution affects various macroeconomic variables. Figure 8 shows the 
impulse responses of various macroeconomic variables to a 1 percent negative food 
productivity shock under flexible headline inflation targeting for a high value of the 
elasticity of substitution (!  = 2 ) and also a low value (!  = 0.6).  For low values of the 
elasticity of substitution, a positive deviation (from the respective steady state) in the food 
price and wage of credit-constrained households is large. When the elasticity of substitution 
is high, the wage of credit-constrained consumers in fact declines relative to the steady state 
value (as the increase in the price of food is significantly lower).  
 
In Tables 9-12, we present the results of sensitivity analysis with respect to the inverse of 
the Frisch elasticity (! ), price stickiness (! ), fraction of credit-constrained households 
(! ) and the mark-up in the sticky price sector (! ). We have selected the most common 
values of these parameters used in the literature to carry out the sensitivity experiments.  
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Our results appear robust to the selection of parameter values around their baseline 
values.  
 
Following Gali et al. (2004), we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to the coefficients 
of the Taylor rule (Table 13). Flexible headline inflation targeting performs better than other 
regimes irrespective of the choice of Taylor rule coefficients. We also compute the Taylor 
rule parameters associated with optimal strict core inflation targeting under the baseline case 
and compare the welfare gains associated with adopting flexible headline inflation 
targeting.
36 We find that the welfare gains are still positive. 
 
Shocks to productivity in the food sector are regarded as transitory and highly volatile. So 
we do additional sensitivity analysis for various combinations of the degrees of persistence 
and volatility of these shocks. From the results shown in Table 14, it is evident that our 
results are robust to various combinations and also that welfare gains from adopting flexible 
headline targeting are even higher if shocks are less persistent and highly volatile. Of 
course, in the case of an advanced economy like the U.S. where the volatility of these 
shocks is an order of magnitude smaller than in typical emerging markets, the potential 
welfare gains are considerably smaller.  
5.1 Extensions of the Model 
We consider two extensions of our baseline model. The first extension looks at an 
alternative characterization of complete markets. Most existing models with complete 
markets assume that agents can insure against income risks ex ante. In other words, 
insurance contracts are written before households know which sector they are in (see, 
e.g., Aoki, 2001). This assumption implies that, given the same initial wealth, consumers 
will choose identical consumption streams. A more realistic way of characterizing 
complete markets is to assume that consumers can insure against income risks but only 
after being assigned to a particular sector. One could regard this as a complete market 
                                                 
36 For computing optimal parameters, we restrict our search to [0,3] for  ! " and [0,1] for  i ! . We 
find that the best rule requires  ! " = 3 and  i ! = 0.95. The value of  ! " is the largest value that we 
allow for in our search. If we left this parameter unconstrained, then optimal policy would call for 
an arbitrarily large coefficient on inflation. The reason is that in that case, under the optimal 
policy, inflation would in effect be forever constant so that the economy would be characterized 
by zero inflation volatility (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007).  
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setting conditional on worker assignment to sectors, which is determined ex-ante (before 
insurance contracts are written). In other words, a household cannot insure against cross-
sector income risk. Under this alternate market structure, each type of household chooses 
a consumption stream to maximize its lifetime utility subject to its idiosyncratic budget 
constraint (see Appendix III for more details). In Table 15, we present the welfare gains 
under this market structure and with flexible headline inflation targeting. It appears that, 
for our baseline model, flexible headline inflation targeting does better than strict core 
inflation targeting. However, for higher values of the elasticity of substitution between 
food and nonfood goods, the welfare gains are essentially zero.  
 
A second extension of our baseline model looks at a more general case where agents in 
both sectors can be credit constrained. We assume that a fraction  0 1 > !  and  0 2 > !  of 
households in the flexible price sector and sticky price sector, respectively, can insure 
against income risks ex post.
37 We look at combinations of  1 ! and  2 ! such that 50 percent 
of the households in the economy are credit constrained.
38 Table 16 presents the welfare 
gains of pursuing flexible headline inflation targeting for some possible combinations of 
1 ! and  2 ! . It is clear that even under this general setting targeting flexible headline 
inflation outperforms a strict core inflation targeting rule. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
Inflation targeting, which had become widely popular in both advanced and emerging 
market economies over the last two decades, has come under attack after the global 
financial crisis as it is believed to leave no room for central bankers to pay attention to 
asset price bubbles. Whatever the outcome of that broader debate, the reality is that the 
primary objective of most central banks, whether or not they explicitly target inflation, is 
still to keep inflation low and stable. To achieve this objective, the choice of the 
appropriate price index to measure inflation remains a key operational issue. Previous 
research has indicated that central banks should only focus on stabilizing core inflation. 
                                                 
37 This implies that  ) ( 1 2 1 ! ! ! + " + fraction of households are credit constrained. 
38 This is consistent with the empirical evidence that only about 42 percent of households in 
emerging markets have access to formal finance (Table 3).  
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However, these results rely heavily on the assumption that markets are complete and that 
price stickiness is the only source of distortion in the economy. 
 
In this paper, we have developed a more realistic model with the following key features –
incomplete markets, characterized by the presence of credit-constrained consumers; 
households requiring a minimum subsistence level of food to survive; low price elasticity 
of demand for food items and a high share of expenditure on food in households’ total 
expenditure. These features, particularly the last one, are especially relevant for emerging 
market economies.  
 
We show that, in the presence of credit-constrained consumers, targeting core inflation is 
no longer welfare maximizing. Also, stabilizing inflation is not sufficient to stabilize 
output when markets are not complete. Under these conditions, flexible headline inflation 
targeting—which involves targeting headline inflation and putting some weight on the 
output gap--is the optimal monetary policy rule.  
 
Our results differ from those of traditional models due to the presence of financial 
frictions in the economy. Lack of access to finance makes the demand of credit-
constrained households insensitive to interest rate fluctuations. Their demand is 
determined by real wages, which depend on prices in the flexible price sector. Thus, if the 
central bank ignores fluctuations in the flexible price sector, aggregate demand may in 
fact move in the opposite direction to what is intended by the monetary policy 
intervention. To have the desired effect on aggregate demand, the central bank has to 
target a price index that would dampen the response of credit-constrained consumers. In 
our setting, this means that the central bank should target headline inflation.  
  
Our results have special significance for central banks in emerging markets, where food 
consumption remains a major component of household consumption expenditures and the 
share of the population that is credit-constrained is large. While our model is a simple 
one, it amply highlights the significance of financial frictions for the choice of optimal 
price index and the optimal monetary policy rule. The widely accepted result of focusing  
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on core CPI in order to stabilize inflation and output needs a careful re-examination in the 




                                                 
39 In related work, Catao and Chang (2010) show that, for a small open economy that is a net buyer of food, 
the high volatility of world food prices implies that headline CPI inflation targeting is welfare improving 
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Figure 1. Share of Expenditure on Food,1996 
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Source: WDI and International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research 
Service, USDA. 
 
Note: Expenditure on food includes expenditure on food prepared at home and consumed  
plus beverages and tobacco. 
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Source: WDI and International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research   
Service, USDA. 
 
Notes: These country-specific income-elasticity values represent the estimated percentage  
change in demand for food if total income increases by 1 percent. Food includes food prepared  
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      Source: WDI and International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research 
Service, USDA. 
 
Notes: Country-specific elasticity value represents a percentage change in demand for food 
if food prices increase by 1 percent (keeping real income constant). Food includes food 







Figure 4. Levels and Volatility of Inflation 
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Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
 
Notes: Core index for USA is defined as CPI excluding food and energy while for Canada it is 
defined as CPI excluding food, energy and indirect taxes. Inflation is year-on-year inflation 
calculated using quarterly price index. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of inflation 
using a rolling 20-quarter (5-year) window. We also computed the volatility using 8-year and 10-





Figure 5. Levels and Volatility of Inflation 

























































































Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
 
Notes: Core index for Korea is defined as CPI excluding agricultural products and oil while for 
Thailand it is defined as CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy. Inflation is year-on-year 
inflation using quarterly price index. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of inflation 
using a rolling 20-quarter (5-year) window. We also computed the volatility using 8-year and 10-








Figure 6. Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock 




Notes: Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Strict core inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy regime given by 
equation (35). Strict headline inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy 





Figure 7. Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock 





Notes: Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Strict core inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy regime given by 
equation (35). Flexible headline inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy 






Figure 8. Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock under Flexible 
Headline Inflation Targeting Rule 




Notes: Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. These impulse responses are generated with central bank following the flexible headline 








Table 1. Share of Food Expenditure in Total Household Expenditure  
 
Emerging Markets    Advanced Economies   
Indonesia  53.0  Japan  14.7 
Vietnam  49.8  Germany  11.5 
India  48.8  Australia  10.8 
China  36.7  Canada  9.3 
Russia  33.2  United Kingdom  8.8 
Malaysia  28.0  USA  5.7 
Average  41.6  Average  10.1 
 
Source: Household Surveys, CEIC, International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic 
Research Service, USDA and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Data for emerging markets are for 2005 while for advanced economies it is for 2006. 
Expenditure on food includes expenditure on food consumed at home only and does not include 













































Vietnam  0.73  -0.37  New Zealand  0.39  -0.29 
Pakistan  0.72  -0.38  Finland  0.39  -0.29 
Jordan  0.70  -0.39  Sweden  0.36  -0.27 
Indonesia  0.69  -0.39  Netherlands  0.36  -0.27 
Philippines  0.66  -0.39  France  0.33  -0.25 
Peru  0.66  -0.39  United 
Kingdom  0.33  -0.25 
Thailand  0.65  -0.39  Belgium  0.33  -0.25 
Egypt  0.64  -0.39  Norway  0.32  -0.24 
Brazil  0.62  -0.39  Austria  0.31  -0.24 
Russia  0.62  -0.39  Germany  0.31  -0.23 
Turkey  0.61  -0.39  Australia  0.30  -0.23 
Iran  0.60  -0.39  Japan  0.29  -0.22 
Mexico  0.59  -0.38  Canada  0.28  -0.22 
Chile  0.59  -0.38  Switzerland  0.26  -0.20 
Poland  0.58  -0.38  Denmark  0.25  -0.19 
Hungary  0.54  -0.37  Luxembourg  0.13  -0.10 
Argentina  0.52  -0.36  United States  0.10  -0.08 
Average  0.63  -0.38  Average  0.30  -0.22 
 
Source: WDI and International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research Service, 
USDA. 
Notes: These country-specific income-elasticity values represent the estimated percentage change 
in demand for food if total income increases by 1 percent. Country-specific price-elasticity value 
represents a percentage change in demand for food if food prices increase by 1 percent (keeping 
real income constant). Food includes food prepared at home and consumed plus beverages and 




Table 3. Composite Measure of Access to Financial Services in Emerging Markets 
(2008) 
 
  Percent with 
access    Percent with 
access 
Argentina  28  Mexico  25 
Brazil  43  Nigeria  15 
Chile  60  Pakistan  12 
China  42  Peru  26 
Egypt  41  Philippines  26 
India  48  Poland  66 
Indonesia  40  Russia  69 
Iran  31  South Africa  46 
Korea  63  Thailand  59 
Malaysia  60  Turkey  49 
    Average  42 
 
Source: “Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access,” World Bank, 2008. 
Note: The composite indicator measures the percentage of the adult population with access to an 

















Table 4. Average Inflation, Volatility and Persistence of Inflation 
(March 1991 – September 2009)
a 
 































Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Core price index in USA excludes food and energy from the CPI while in Canada it 
excludes indirect taxes in addition to food and energy. Thailand’s core index excludes 
unprocessed food and energy while in Korea it excludes agricultural products and oil. Inflation is 
year-on-year inflation rate calculated using a quarterly price index. Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of inflation using a rolling 20 quarter (5 year) window. Persistence parameter 
is the estimated co-efficient from a simple AR(1) model. The symbol *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Newey-West corrected standard errors (for MA(3) correction) are 
reported in brackets. 








Table 5. Parameter Calibration: Baseline Model 
 
Parameters  Definitions  Values 
!   Risk aversion  2 
!   Subjective discount factor  0.9902 
!   Inverse of Frisch elasticity  3 
!   Probability of firm not changing price  0.66 
!   Elasticity of substitution between food and 
non-food  0.60 
!   Weight on food in the price index  0.3050 
!   Households with credit constraints 
(unconstrained households have measure 1)  1 
!   Elasticity of substitution between different 
non-food goods  10 
Y !   Weight on output gap in Taylor rule  0.5 
! "   Weight on inflation gap in Taylor rule  2 
i !   Weight on interest rate smoothing in Taylor 
rule  0.70 
af !   Persistence of food productivity shock  0.25 
as !   Persistence of non-food productivity shock  0.95 
af !   Standard deviation of food productivity 
shock  0.03 
as !   Standard deviation of non-food productivity 












Table 6. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules  
 
























-0.07  -0.22  -0.19  3.21  4.18  1.58 
 
Notes: Welfare gains (! *100) are defined as the percent increase in the strict core inflation 
targeting consumption process necessary to make the level of welfare under strict core inflation 
targeting policy identical to that under the evaluated policy. Thus, a positive number indicates 
that welfare is higher under the alternative policy than under the strict core inflation targeting 
policy. Targeting policy rules are defined in equations (35) - (38).  
 
Table 7. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules  
Without Subsistence-Level Food  
 
Welfare gain (in percent of strict core inflation targeting consumption) 





















0.4  -0.10  -0.16  -0.12  1.15  1.42  0.77 
0.5  -0.10  -0.16  -0.13  0.12  0.24  0.16 
0.6
a  -0.09  -0.16  -0.14  -0.03  0.02  0.02 
 
See notes to table 6. 
 













Table 8. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules  
for Different Values of Elasticity of Substitution (! ) 
 
Welfare gain (in percent of strict core inflation targeting consumption) 
 



























-0.22  -0.20  0.19  0.54  0.23 
0.8  -0.06  -0.22  -0.20  -0.02  0.09  0.02 
0.9  -0.05  -0.22  -0.20  -0.04  -0.03  -0.05 
1.5  -0.03  -0.22  -0.22  -0.01  -0.11  -0.11 
2.0  -0.02  -0.22  -0.22  0.00  -0.12  -0.12 
  
See notes to table 6. 
 
 a. Baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 9. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules  
for Different Parameter Values of Inverse of Frisch Elasticity (! ) 
 








2  0.00  0.38  0.38 
3
a  3.21  4.18  1.58 
4  1.32  2.12  1.01 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Parameter value of 2 implies labor elasticity of 0.5 while 
parameter value of 4 implies labor elasticity of 0.25. 
 
a. Baseline value of this parameter.                          
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Table 10. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules 











0.50  2.30  2.90  1.24 
0.66
a  3.21  4.18  1.58 
0.75  3.64  5.24  2.89 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Parameter value of 0.5 implies that the mean duration prices remain 
fixed is 2 quarters while value of 0.75 implies the mean duration prices remain fixed is 4 quarters. 
 
a. Baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 11. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules 











a  3.21  4.18  1.58 
2.00  0.05  0.89  0.73 
3.00  -0.03  0.75  0.73 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Parameter value of 2 implies that two-thirds of households are in the 
flexible price sector and are credit constrained. Parameter value of 3 implies that three-quarters of 
households are in the flexible price sector and are credit constrained. 
 



















Table 12. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules  












5  2.65  3.27  1.55 
10
a  3.21  4.18  1.58 
15  3.36  4.85  2.54 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. The parameter !  also determines the markup in the sticky price 
sector. A parameter value of 5 implies a markup of 25 percent and a value of 15 implies a mark 
up of 7 percent. 
 
a. Baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 13. Welfare Gains from Alternative Inflation Targeting Rules 
for Different Taylor Rule Parameters 
 
(a)  Changing Coefficient on Inflation Gap in Taylor rule ( ! " ) 
 








0.50  -2.74  5.32  3.76 
1.00  2.40  4.94  2.95 
1.50  3.12  4.53  2.45 
2.00
a  3.21  4.18  1.58 
2.50  3.15  3.87  1.84 
3.00  3.04  3.62  1.65 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline values 
( i ! =0.7,  Y ! =0.5). 
 





(b) Changing Coefficient on Output Gap in Taylor Rule ( Y ! ) 
 








0.00  3.21     
0.50
a    4.18  1.58 
1.00    4.25  2.72 
1.50    2.26  3.03 
2.00    4.25  3.23 
2.50    4.25  3.36 
 
Nots: See notes to table 6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline values 
( i ! =0.7,  ! " =2). 
a. Baseline value of this parameter. 
 










0.00  -5.58  3.79  2.73 
0.10  -3.11  4.01  2.71 
0.20  -1.20  4.16  2.66 
0.30  0.26  4.25  2.59 
0. 40  1.36  4.28  2.48 
0.50  2.18  4.27  2.36 
0.60  2.78  4.23  2.23 
0.70
a  3.21  4.18  2.10 
0.80  3.52  4.11  1.97 
0.90  3.73  4.05  1.86 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline values 
( ! " =2,  Y ! =0.5). 




Table 14. Welfare Gains of Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting for Different 
Combinations of Persistence and Volatility of Food Productivity Shock 
 
Volatility of Shocks 
 
0.02  0.03  0.04 
0.10  2.27  4.62  7.99 
0.25  2.08  4.18  7.18 













0.95  0.77  1.19  1.75 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. Persistence of food productivity is the estimated coefficient of AR(1) 
process in equation (39). Volatility of food productivity shock is the standard deviation of random 
shocks to productivity. Persistence and volatility of non-food shocks is held constant at 0.95 and 
0.02, respectively, in the above welfare cost calculations. 
 
 
Table 15. Welfare Gains from Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting  
under Alternate Complete Market Structures 
 
Elasticity of Substitution  Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting 
0.6
a  0.24 
0.7  0.05 
0.8  -0.02 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. 
 
a. Baseline value of this parameter, which represents the elasticity of substitution between food 


















Table 16. Welfare Gains from Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting 
under General Model 
 
Fraction of households in 
sticky price sector with 
access to formal finance 
Fraction of households in 
flexible price sector with 
access to formal finance 
Welfare gains from 
flexible headline inflation 
targeting 
0.10  0.90  0.38 
0.20  0.80  0.22 
0.30  0.70  0.21 
0.40  0.60  0.22 
0.50  0.50  0.24 
0.60  0.40  0.26 
0.70  0.30  0.28 
0.80  0.20  0.29 
0.90  0.10  0.30 
 
Notes: See notes to table 6. We have chosen combinations of  1 ! and  2 ! such that overall 50 
percent of households in the economy are credit constrained. 























Competitive Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets 
 
This  appendix  gives  the  system  of  equations  (in  terms  of  stationary  variables) 
characterizing the competitive equilibrium under the incomplete market settings. 
 
Demand equation for flexible price sector household  
*
, , , C x y x C t f t f t f
f
t ! =                (52) 
Supply equation of flexible price sector (food sector) firm 
) 1 (
, , , ) ( ) ( ) (
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Price index in sticky price good sector  
[ ] ! ! ! " " # # # # # + $ = 1
1
1 ) 1 (
, ) 1 ( ) ( 1 t t s x             (56) 




, , ) ( ) ( ) ) (( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) (
! " ! # ! " ! $ $
+ % % + % = = t s
s
t t s t n t s
s
t t s n
r
t A C Y x A C z y z MC   (57) 




, , , , ) 1 ( ) ( C C x C y Y t t f t f t f t f ! " !
# + + = = =
$           (58) 
Market clearing condition for sticky price good 
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Aggregate Price Index 
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Relation between headline and sticky price index 
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Derivation of Welfare Gains Associated with Different Targeting Rules 
 
 
Welfare gain is given by 
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Alternative Market Structures 
 
A. Alternative Structure of Complete Markets 
 
We consider a setting in which consumers can write contracts to insure against 
idiosyncratic income risks but only after being assigned to a particular sector. One could 
regard this as a complete market setting conditional on worker assignment to sectors, 
which is determined ex-ante (before insurance contracts are written). In other words, a 
household cannot insure against cross-sector income risk.   
 
Households in the Flexible Price Sector  
 
A representative household in the flexible price sector maximizes its lifetime utility given 
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t B is the quantity of one-period nominal riskfree discount bonds bought in period t  
and maturing in period t+1. Maximization with respect to 
f
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Households in the Sticky Price Sector  
 
A representative household in the sticky price sector maximizes its lifetime utility given 
by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint
41 
 
                                                 
40 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques 
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, where !  is a 
parameter and 
f B  is the steady state value of the bond holding. 
41 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques 
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t B represent the quantity of one period nominal riskless discount bond bought in 
period t  and maturing in period t+1. Maximization with respect to 
s
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t B B !             (67) 
 
Equations (53), (55)-(62) of Appendix I and (63)-(67) expressed in terms of stationary 
variables define the system of equations that, combined with the monetary policy rule and 
exogenous stochastic processes for  t f A ,  and t s A , , determine the equilibrium path of the 
economy under this setting. 
 
B. General Case with Credit-Constrained Households in Each Sector 
 
We consider a more general case where households in each sector can be credit 
constrained. Let  0 1 > !  and  0 2 > !  be the fractions of households that have access to 
financial markets in the flexible price sector and in the sticky price sector, respectively. 
So in this general setting there are four different kinds of agents in the economy based on 
the sector of economy and access to financial markets. Here again we assume that 
households with access to financial markets can only insure against income risks ex post. 
 




A representative household that has access to financial markets in the flexible price sector 
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42 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques 
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parameter and 
f B  is the steady state value of the bond holding.  
 
64 
Maximization with respect to 
f
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Constrained Households     
 
The representative credit-constrained consumer in the flexible price sector maximizes 
lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint 
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A representative household in the sticky price sector that has access to financial markets 
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Maximization with respect to 
s
t C1 yields the Euler equation 
 
                                                 
43 In order to solve the model with available techniques by linearizing it around the steady state, 
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A representative credit-constrained household in the sticky price sector maximizes its 
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Flexible Price Sector 
 
Firms in the flexible price sector are price taking and therefore the price of the flexible 
price good is given by equation (21). Combining this with the labor supply decision of 
households given by equations (70) and (72) and recognizing that 
f
t t f t f
f






























































Sticky Price Sector 
 
Since firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they will all choose the same price.
44 The 
marginal costs of firms held by unconstrained and constrained households are therefore 
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where we have used the fact that  ) ( ) (   and   (z) ) ( 2 , 2 1 , 1 z N A z y N A z y
s
t t s t s
s




Household demand for flexible price and sticky price goods is given by expressions 
similar to equation (10), (11), (18) and (19) with 
f
t C  and 
s
t C  replaced by 
f
it C  and 
s
it C  
where i=1, 2. Total demand for the flexible price good is given by 
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The market for the flexible price good clears 
 
t f t f t f t f C y y Y , , 2 1 , 1 1 , ) ( = ! + = " " "             (85) 
                                                 
44 Those who can change prices will choose the same price while others will continue with the prices fixed 
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The market for the sticky price good clears 
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The bond market clears 
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Equations (55), (56), (60), (61) of Appendix I and (68), (69), (71), (73), (74), (76), (78)-
(87) expressed in terms of stationary variables define the system of equations that, 
combined with the monetary policy rule and exogenous stochastic processes for  t f A ,  
and t s A , , determine the equilibrium path of the economy under this general setting. 
 
 
 
 